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In South Africa (SA), with the advent of democracy, both land and water institutions have undergone, and are still 
undergoing, reform measures, especially to address equity and promote rural development. However, despite the 
apparent inter-linkages of land and water in rural livelihoods and agricultural development, the implementation of 
such reforms has been done separately. Field work conducted on the communal small scale irrigation schemes 
(SIS) of Nzhelele and Thabina highlighted not only the lack of coherence between the land and water reform 
programmes, but it also showed the implementation constraints of the programmes individually. Although 
articulating land reform to water reform seems necessary, the lack of effective implementation of water reform 
remains an obstacle, constraining rural livelihoods and agricultural development. In addition, for it to effectively 
address equity and promote rural development, it seems necessary for the water/land reforms to be linked to 
broader agrarian reforms, taking into consideration support services, market access and the overall rural, often 
multiple, livelihoods and strategies3.  
 
Introduction: separate water and land reforms in 
South Africa 
23As rural economies are mainly agrarian based, their 
development is linked to access to natural resources. 
Land and water form part of the most crucial of these 
natural resources. As land and water are finite and 
scarce resources, access to them needs to be 
regulated, particularly to achieve equity and 
sustainability. 
Institutions, both formal and informal, are the basis by 
which local communities gain access and exert control 
on the use of resources such as land and water. In 
SA, both land and water institutions have undergone 
reforms with the advent of democracy, especially to 
address the racially motivated unequal access 
occasioned by segregatory colonial rule and apartheid.  
The democratic government of SA introduced the 
Water Act No.36 in 1998, which mainly sought to 
achieve sustainability, efficiency and equity in water 
resources management (SA, 1998). For this to be 
done effectively, government has adopted the 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) 
framework, which emphasises the principles of 
decentralisation and user participation (DWAF, 2004) 
amongst others. The new legislation allows users, 
through Water User Associations (WUA), to participate 
in decision making by decentralising water 
management to catchment and local levels (Jaspers, 
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2001). On the land side, in the former homelands, 
government is dealing with insecure communal land 
tenure through the Communal Land Rights Act 
(CLARA) of 2004. Although CLARA is still to be 
implemented, it aims at creating institutions to better 
define and secure ownership and use of land (SA, 
2004). This ownership can be on the communal, co-
operative basis, or in the extreme case, might lead to 
individualised privatisation (Anseeuw, 2006).  
Despite the apparent inter linkages of land and water 
in agrarian livelihoods and economies, the 
implementation of such reforms has been done 
separately. A study, made by the University of 
Pretoria, in the framework of the ARISE project4, 
aimed at identifying the problems arising from the 
uncoordinated implementation of land and water 
reforms. The main objective was to analyse, through 
two empirical case-studies (Nzhelele and Thabina 
irrigation schemes in the Limpopo Province, South 
Africa), the potential contribution of land tenure reform 
on small holder irrigation on communal land, where 
water reform was already implemented. 
 
Low production and productivity levels of 
irrigation farmers with multiple livelihoods 
 Communal areas have had a history of 
underutilisation of land (Kamara et al, 2002). 
Currently, there is fallow land in communal small scale 
irrigation schemes (SIS) even in cases where water is 
available. Given the possible change of land rights, will 
SIS farmers’ access to water improve or worsen and, 
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consequently, will the utilisation of plot land be 
improved or constrained? 
Land is underutilised in both studied schemes. On 
average, only 64% of land is productive. In addition, 
land productivity is also low. Using the National 
Department of Agriculture (NDA) average yield 
estimates for irrigated crops as comparison, maize, 
the major crop in both SIS, is up to 70% below 
optimum, while for other crops such as vegetables, 
productivity is 50% below potential. Consequently, plot 
income is far below optimum in both schemes. 
 
Major farm and household characteristics in Nzhelele and 
Thabina SIS: 
o Elderly farming population: Average age was 63 
years. 
o Diverse portfolio of livelihood sources, namely 
employment, agriculture, remittances, independent 
activities and government welfare grants.  
o Welfare grants are the major income sources, 
followed by agriculture and remittances. 
o 62.5% of the households’ income is from non 
agricultural sources. However, besides welfare, 
agriculture provides highest income.  
o Land administration is under the traditional authority 
(permission to occupy (PTO) certificate), issued by 
the chief. Leasing of land is officially not allowed in 
both schemes, but in practise it does sometimes 
happen. 
o Water reform has been implemented, but not 
effectively. Water reform has failed to improve water 
access and supply at SIS level. WUAs have been 
formed, but they are not operational. Water allocation 
is based on time, without payment for water use, nor 
water rights or licences. The schemes are run by 
government through extension officers.  
When land tenure reform is implemented, it is 
expected that more effective land use will ensue, as 
land rights will allow farmers to privately hold, lease or 
sell land. More land, it is expected, will therefore be 
put under crops, increasing productivity and farm 
income (De Soto, 2000).  
However, results have shown that land rights alone 
will not guarantee plot usage and productivity in these 
SIS. Two main reasons appear. The first relates to the 
present historical-institutional SIS setting: rights alone 
will not create a land market. Although the majority of 
farmers want land tenure reform, they seem to want 
the title deed more for protection from traditional 
authority than for production reasons. Farmers value 
land more as an insurance against poverty than as a 
productive asset (Denison and Manona, 2007). The 
creation of a land market through leasing and selling 
remains therefore uncertain after land reform. The 
second reason is the multiple sources of livelihood of 
communal SIS households. Alternative sources of 
income lead to a divergence of decision making 
patterns regarding agriculture. Agriculture’s viability is 
presently too low (Kamara et al, 2002) and farming 
provides a too low proportion of household income for 
agricultural/livelihood decision-making processes - 
based on a large portfolio, within which agriculture is 
only a minor part - to be related to land or water 
determinants (Perret et al., 2005). 
In addition, other factors will still hinder agricultural 
production after land reform, notably the cost of inputs 
and lack of credit, few market opportunities and poor 
access to irrigation water. First, since the majority of 
communal farmers are pensioners, they lack not only 
the physical capacity to manually till the land but also 
lack adequate income or access to credit to cover the 
costs for land preparation and input purchase5. As 
noted by Denison and Manona (2007), the cost of land 
preparation is so high that SIS farmers end up 
ploughing only part of their total land. Secondly, 
markets play an important role in productivity, income 
contribution and type of crops grown. The choice of 
crops is closely linked to market opportunities found in 
both schemes. Thabina is in a peri-urban area, and 
agriculture in this SIS is more market oriented. In the 
more rurally located Nzhelele farmers farm for 
consumption and only sell the surplus. The very 
limited local market share fails to give incentives to 
farmers. Consequently, their agricultural income is 
minimal. Lastly, despite water reform having been 
implemented, the farmers lack irrigation water. 
Inadequate water supply and lack of, or non-
maintained, water infrastructure were identified by 
farmers as major constraints to farming. On the other 
hand, less than 15% of famers believe land scarcity is 
an issue while land tenure was not mentioned. So 
while shortage of land is a problem to some farmers, 
land rights related to their productive activities are 
clearly not an issue for most of them. However, the 
majority still refused to lease or sell their land should it 
be secured through formal and well-defined rights. 
 
Joined water and land reforms, in the framework of 
an effective broader agrarian reform 
The issue of the poor links between water and land 
rights is problematic, particularly in emerging and 
small scale irrigation farms. As such, under the new 
water law, only WUAs may apply for an irrigation water 
use license and may be granted the right to use non 
domestic water (SA, 1998). Linked to the privatisation 
and possible individualisation of land rights, failure to 
become a WUA member would limit individuals’ right 
to use water (Perret, 2002). Also, through tenure 
reform, co-operatively managed communal land may 
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be transformed into scattered, individual plots if 
members opt for privatisation. This leads to communal 
water rights to be replaced by several individual 
private water rights. Where there are transfers of land 
rights, through the land market, there may also be a 
loss of water rights since water and land rights are 
hold separately. The new land owner must go through 
a separate process to acquire water rights.  
However, this discussion is only useful when any of 
these reforms are effectively being implemented. 
Water reform has been implemented in the schemes, 
but not effectively. It seems water reform has failed to 
improve water access and supply at SIS level. While 
WUAs have been formed, they are not operational 
and, as a result, there is no change in the way water is 
accessed or used. There is no payment for water and 
there are no water rights or licences, a direct violation 
of Chapter 4 of the new Water Act, which stipulates 
that all productive water use should be licensed. The 
schemes are run by government through extension 
officers, not by the farmers, contrary to the principles 
of decentralised water management. Water allocation 
is also based on time, not quantity of water used, 
making it impossible to measure the actual amount of 
water used. Although water reform emphasises 
efficiency, these schemes are still using the wasteful 
flood irrigation method, which also damages soil 
structures and reduces yields (Postel, 2000). 
The water reform implementation has been so 
ineffective that by the time of the study, 66% of 
respondents were not aware of water reform itself, nor 
of the existence of the WUA to which they belong. The 
reform is also set to take longer to establish because 
running the SIS on a cost recovery basis, as WUAs 
should do, is difficult. The current small plots do not 
yield enough cash income to cover water charges, 
maintenance and running costs. Given the farmers’ 
average income, it is also unlikely that they will afford 
to self finance the schemes. 
The failure of water reform is not surprising. Research 
has shown that new water institutions have largely 
been very ineffective and not beneficial to the 
previously disadvantaged (Swatuk, 2005). This is 
mainly due to a weak conceptualisation of new water 
policies. For example, the WUAs are designed from a 
legal and technical position alone. However, building a 
user group is more than just a technical application of 
rules and laws, but rather a political process of 
balancing different demands from different 
stakeholders (Manzungu, 2004). There seems to be a 
lack of such balance as there was no capacity building 
or adequate stakeholder consultation when the WUAs 
were established. 
Water reform has not changed farmers’ situation, as it 
was not effectively implemented, and immediate water 
needs still remain a major constraint. As such, as 
Cousins (2009) pointed out, land rights alone will be 
inadequate to address the situation. And neither will 
be water rights. There is obviously a need for a 
coordinated approach for land and water reform, 
especially given that water reform was attempted but 
land is still communally owned and the water rights 
have failed to take effect. However, there will be a limit 
to potential benefits of water and land reform, whether 
articulated or implemented separately or together, as 
the socio-economic set-ups of the farmers (overall 
livelihood insecurity, diverse livelihoods) are not farm 
based and as farming challenges such as market 
access, cost of inputs and access to credit have 
solutions that are outside the scope of land-water 
reforms. 
To effectively address equity and promote rural 
development, intertwined water-land-reforms should 
be linked to broader agrarian reforms, considering 
support services, market access and the overall rural 
multiple livelihoods in SA. The restructuring of SIS 
farmers and of SA’s smallholder farmers in general 
calls for an overall integrated reform of the agricultural 
and rural sectors. 
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